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Abstract 
Cellular (C) setups facilitate the connectivity amongst the 
devices with better provisioning of services to its users. 
Vehicular networks are one of the representative setups 
that aim at expanding their functionalities by using the 
available cellular systems like Long Term Evolution 
(LTE)-based Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access 
Network (E-UTRAN) as well as the upcoming Fifth 
Generation (5G)-based functional architecture. The 
vehicular networks include Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V), 
Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I), Vehicle to Pedestrian 
(V2P) and Vehicle to Network (V2N), all of which are 
referred to as Vehicle to Everything (V2X). 5G has 
dominated the vehicular network and most of the 
upcoming research is motivated towards the fully 
functional utilization of 5G-V2X. Despite that, credential 
management and edge-initiated security are yet to be 
resolved under 5G-V2X. To further understand the issue, 
this paper presents security management as a principle of 
sustainability and key-management. The performance 
tradeoff is evaluated with the key-updates required to 
maintain a secure connection between the vehicles and the 
5G-terminals. The proposed approach aims at the 
utilization of high-speed mmWave-based backhaul for 
enhancing the security operations between the core and the 
sub-divided functions at the edge of the network through a 
dual security management framework. The evaluations are 
conducted using numerical simulations, which help to 
understand the impact on the sustainability of connections 
as well as identification of the fail-safe points for secure 
and fast operations. Furthermore, the evaluations help to 
follow the multiple tradeoffs of security and performance 
based on the metrics like mandatory key updates, the range 
of operations and the probability of connectivity. 
Keywords: Security, 5G-V2X, Backhaul, Sustainability, 
Key-management, Dual-management. 
1 Introduction 
 
The new radio access technology has led to a major 
transition from Long Term Evolution (LTE)-based 
Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-
UTRAN) to Fifth Generation (5G)-based functional 
architecture for vehicular networks. Such vehicular 
networks, which are predominately supported by the 
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Cellular (C) setups, are termed as C-Vehicle to Everything 
(C-V2X). Enhancing applications with a range of 
operations of C-V2X are one of the key advantages of 5G 
networks [1] [2] [3].  
5G-V2X involves a multi-modular architecture 
where several functions are considered for securing the 
services for vehicles involved in the formation of the 
Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I), 
Vehicle to Pedestrian (V2P) and Vehicle to Network 
(V2N) as a part of V2X, as shown in Fig.1. These networks 
require a special implementation that provides strong 
fronthaul connectivity and edge-initiated security which 
can simultaneously manage the backhaul operations [3] 
[4]. 
Enhancing networks towards edge-infrastructure 
and bringing security functions near to the users are tedious 
tasks to be attained under 5G-V2X. Many studies have 
suggested implementing slice-based V2X, however, a 
sizably voluminous number of key updates and non-
availability of edge-functions lead to overheads and 
deteriorate the performance. Additionally, with most of the 
functions operable at the core, the distance of operations 
increases, and it alarms the possibilities of cyber-attacks on 
both vehicles and connected components. 
There are certain studies that have presented 
security management as a resource allocation problem and 
proposed an optimized network as a solution for enhancing 
the performance of V2X [5] [6] [14]-[24]. These studies do 
not consider any strategic management for combining the 
security of backhaul formed between the Terminal (TM) 
and the hub with the edge-initiated operations.   
 
 
Fig.1 An exemplary illustration of a vehicular network 
based on the cellular infrastructure. 
 
The initial reports on 5G utilize several security 
functions for authenticating the devices involved in the 
transmissions [2] [7]. Solutions for authentications, like 
5G-Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol 
and Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)-AKA 
prime, are discussed as a part of security [2]. Regardless of 
such discussions, the initial reports ignore the overheads 
associated with the periodic updates of the secret keys, the 
range, and mobility of vehicles, as well as the sustainability 
of V2X against a known set of cyber threats [8][9].  
It is a fact that a large number of key updates at 
regular intervals undoubtedly enhance the security of a 
network. But such a procedure causes an unintentional 
burden on the entities leading to high operational cost and 
computational complexity [6] [10]. Considering all the 
above discussions and issues, it is desired to further clarify 
the impact of the key updates and understand its impact on 
the performance of the network. Moreover, utilizing the 
existing security functions of 5G and extending them to the 
edge for V2X security are additional aspects to be 
resolved. In addition, deriving tradeoffs between the 
performance and security while grasping the limits of 
sustainability is a problem to solve, which is not discussed 
by any of the associated works on 5G-V2X. 
Following the above arguments, this article helps 
to understand the principles of security management for 
5G-V2X. It also considers the sub-dividing of the 5G 
security functions for attaining a high rate of sustainability 
at a smaller number of key-updates. Furthermore, the 
entire solution is discussed as a part of a dual security 
management framework, which uses long-range and short-
range based operations and involves sub-divided functions 
for TMs and hubs. Several theoretical aspects and 
analytical evaluations facilitate the understandings on the 
fail-safe points while managing the performance-security 
tradeoffs. In general, bringing security functions near to 
the users in 5G-V2X can be theoretically evaluated from 
this study and feasibilities of key-operations and its 
sustainability can be observed from the proposed dual 
security management framework.  
The remaining part of this article is organized as 
follows: Section 2 presents the problem statement and 
highlights our contribution. Section 3 discusses the related 
works. Section 4 discusses the deployment model with the 
system model in Section 5. The proposed approach is 
presented in Section 6. Section 7 covers numerical 
evaluations. Finally, Section 8 concludes the article. 
 
 
2 Problem Statement and Our 
Contribution 
 
Managing security for backhaul-aware 5G-V2X depends 
on the architectural deployment as well as 5G function-
mappings to the underlaid network. Ideally, this is tedious 
to attain because of the added constraints on operations laid 
by the devices and the key management. These issues 
further become a major concern when the key management 
must be done for edge-initiated devices. Such a focus on 
bringing security-aspects near to users raises concerns of 
trustworthy security facilitations, especially when the 
involved entities are vehicles.  
With varying mobility and high dynamics in 
V2V, V2I and V2P, management of security need an 
efficient solution that can protect the network from 
different types of cyber-attacks caused due to non-update 
of keys and non-compliance of the network for efficient 
key management. Additionally, the identification of fail-
safe points, up to which the network does not require any 
reconfigurations, is a major challenge.  
In this paper, the key exchange passes amongst 
the vehicles and the 5G-security functions are considered. 
These passes are then studied for multiple key updates to 
protect excessive iterations for better performance. 
Credential management, distributed key-hierarchy 
principles and edge-initiated security are further 
considered as a part of the problem. 
It should be considered with extreme importance 
that for the networks including a large set of applications, 
updating keys after a certain interval becomes a crucial 
part. Evidently, the network with many key-updates is 
much secured but with a huge downgrading impact on the 
performance. Thus, it is required to balance this tradeoff 
while attaining an efficient backhaul-aware 5G-V2X. 
Considering the problems defined in the earlier part, the 
key solutions of this article can be summarized as follows: 
• At first, the network is modeled to fit into the 
requirements of sustainability, which governs the 
entire system and help to build a backhaul-aware 5G-
V2X by re-modeling Impact-Population-Affluence-
Technology (IPAT) formulations [11]. This model 
allows consideration of the independent factors as 
well as offers flexibility in modeling systems with a 
simplistic approach as there is not a concurrent model 
to consider the effects of the vehicular system on the 
pass involved in the authentications. 
• A dual security management framework is presented 
that considers security through long-range and short-
range authentications between the entities. 
• Multiple fail-safe points are identified as a part of the 
optimization solution until which, the network can be 
operated without changing the derived keys. 
• The key hierarchy principle is remodeled for 
managing the keys attained from the 5G security 
functions.  
• Numerical simulations are conducted to present the 
tradeoffs as well as understand the efficacy of the 
proposed system. 
 
 
3 Related Works 
 
The emerging vehicular technologies leverage various 
solutions emphasized on communication efficiency, 
mobility and low latency [12]. The 5G era is the adoption 
of such an advantage that facilitates the service with better 
connectivity and high speed. The adoption of such 
technologies is still affected by several issues related to 
security, privacy, key management, and performance. Due 
to an increase in the number of security threats, its study 
and vulnerabilities in the V2X communication received 
lots of attention from the industrial researchers. The 
security vulnerabilities can lead to an attack on 
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and availability of 
network in vehicular communication. Moreover, it affects 
performance due to improper credential management for 
vehicles. Several solutions have been proposed by 
different researchers across the globe aiming at the security 
and performance of V2X, which is primarily backed by the 
cellular setups.   
Sun et al. [14] proposed a game-theoretic utility 
model for QoS and security strength in vehicular ad-hoc 
networks. Their utility model has secured the information 
capacity based on the security players. Rigazzi et al. [15] 
proposed a trustworthy communication framework based 
on Bloom filters to compress the Certificate Revocation 
Lists (CRLs). It is identified that the significant overhead 
reduction with low complexity is another challenge for the 
adoption of dynamic security models in vehicular 
communications. 
Lai et al. [16] focused on the software-defined 
based secure group communications in the V2X. The 
group communication enhances road safety and provides 
high-performance data transmission service for vehicular 
networks. The authors further discussed the security issues 
of 5G-VANETs. They also presented a secure and efficient 
group mobility management framework for the vehicular 
environment. Such considerations need to focus on 
handover signaling overheads and latency.  
Bian et al. [17] reviewed the security threats 
against the crowd sensing mechanism in V2X and 
highlighted the platoon disruption and perception data 
falsification attacks. Furthermore, Bian et al. [19] 
investigated the security vulnerabilities in use cases of 
V2X communications. Ferreira et al. [22] also reviewed 
wireless vehicular communications based on security 
properties. Whitefield et al. [18] focused on the privacy 
preservation of the vehicles. The authors presented Direct 
Anonymous Attestation (DAA) pseudonym framework 
and suggested a significant amendment of privacy 
constraints in the new releasing security documents for 
V2X.  
Fraiji et al. [20] emphasized the security issues of 
the Internet of Electric Vehicles. The authors discussed 
security vulnerabilities, replay attacks, false data injection, 
and jamming attacks. Ahmed and Lee [21] focused on the 
secure resource allocation in the vehicular networks. 
Naderpour et al. [23] highlighted the privacy issues in the 
V2X and suggested an auditable De-anonymization 
scheme. This scheme is based on the security credential 
management system and private audit keys. Despite these 
efforts, the emerging V2X network demands considerable 
security solutions without affecting the performance of the 
network. A state-of-the-art comparison, as shown in Table 
1, is provided to understand the reachability of the existing 
solutions. 
 
 
Table 1. A state-of-the-art comparison of existing 
solutions for secure vehicular communications. 
 
Approach Author Ideology Parameter/
Concept 
Used 
Security 
Game-
theoretic 
model for 
QoS and 
security 
strength 
Sun et al. 
[14] 
Nash 
equilibriu
m 
Effect of the 
frame length, 
Nakagami 
fading 
parameter, 
total node 
density, 
density of 
eavesdropper 
nodes 
Yes 
Trustworthy 
communicati
ons 
framework 
Rigazzi et al. 
[15] 
Certificate 
Revocatio
n Lists 
(CRL) 
compressi
on through 
Bloom 
filters 
Compression 
gain, Optimal 
number of 
hash 
functions, 
CRL delivery 
ratio 
Yes 
Secure group 
communicati
on 
Lai et al. [16] Software 
defined 
technology 
Signaling 
cost, 
handover 
latency 
Yes 
Review the 
security 
threats 
against 
the crowd 
sensing 
mechanism 
in V2X 
networks 
Bian et al. 
[17] 
Platoon 
disruption 
attack, 
perception 
data 
falsificatio
n attack 
Trajectory 
calculation 
Yes 
Direct 
Anonymous 
Attestation 
(DAA)pseud
onym 
framework 
Whitefield et 
al. [18] 
DAA 
protocol 
User-
controlled 
unlinkability 
and 
anonymity, 
Assurance of 
revocation 
Yes 
Investigate 
security of 
V2X 
communicati
on 
Bian et al. 
[19] 
Security 
threats 
Trajectory 
calculation 
Yes 
Security 
issues of the 
Internet of 
Electric 
Vehicles 
Fraiji et al. 
[20] 
Vulnerabil
ity analysis 
Replay 
attack, false 
data 
injection, 
jamming 
attack 
Yes 
Secure 
resource 
allocation 
scheme 
Ahmed and 
Lee [21] 
3GPP 
based 
Random 
Access 
with Status 
Feedback 
(RASFB) 
Success Rate, 
Resource 
Utilization, 
packet 
reception 
ratio 
Yes 
Review 
wireless 
vehicular 
communicati
on 
Ferreira et al. 
[22] 
Security 
properties 
Incident 
detection and 
Recovery 
Yes 
Auditable 
De-
anonymizatio
n 
Naderpour et 
al. [23] 
Security 
Credential 
Manageme
nt System 
(SCMS), 
private 
audit key 
_Tagging and 
log-chains 
with lawful 
identity 
resolution 
Yes 
Beamformin
g design for 
secure V2X 
Li et al. [24] Non-
convex 
optimizati
on 
problem 
harvested 
power, 
channel 
estimation 
error 
Yes 
 
 
 
Fig.2 An exemplary illustration of 5G-V2X with mmWave 
Backhaul between the Hub and the terminal based on the 
5G security and general network functions initially 
presented in [13] (AMF: Access and Mobility 
Management Function, PCF: Policy Control Function, 
AUSF: Authentication Server Function, ARPF: 
Authentication Credential Repository and Processing 
Function, SEAF: Security Anchor Function, SMF: Session 
Management Function, UDM: Unified Data Management, 
AF: Application Function, (R)-AN: (Radio) Access 
Network, DN: Data Network, UPF: User Plane Function, 
TM: Terminal, UE: User Equipment (Vehicle)). 
 
 
4 Deployment Model 
 
The network is derived using the existing 5G security 
functions, which helps to map the edge devices to the core. 
The backhaul is dominated by the mmWave technology, 
which helps to maintain a high speed of accessibility for 
the User Equipment (UE), as shown in Fig.2. The UEs 
include the vehicles which are the observers in the V2V, 
V2I and V2P formations. The core comprises the Access 
and Mobility Management Function (AMF), which 
operates together with the Session Management Function 
(SMF) and Policy Control Function (PCF), and the 
Security Anchor Function (SEAF) is placed in their 
periphery which is located deep in the network without any 
knowledge to the edge as well as vehicles as stated in [2].  
 The present draft is unable to provide any proven support 
for deploying edge-initiated security as well as the 
distributed authentication for V2X, which is attained 
through the proposed solution.  
The proposed model presents a new disintegrated 
structure to make the 5G-drafted version suitable for V2X 
based on key-divisibility. In the considered model, the 
SEAF keys and hierarchical authentication are driven by 
the Authentication Server Function (AUSF) and the 
Authentication Credential Repository and Processing 
Function (ARPF) [2]. To make the 5G-V2X supportable 
for backhaul and provide additional situational awareness, 
the mmWave technology is considered for supporting the 
Unified Data Management (UDM), Application Function 
(AF), (Radio) Access Network ((R)-AN), and User Plane 
Function (UPF).  
 
5 System Model 
 
As stated in the problem statement, the security 
management for V2X is tedious as it involves multiple 
authentications. This issue becomes further complex when 
we are to deploy the security functions at the edge of the 
network. This procedure involves complex modeling, 
which might affect the cost of the network. 
The proposed approach operates by considering 
the security directly proportional to the number of key-
updates performed in the V2X between the TMs and the 
Core.  With the number of updates growing extensively, 
the network suffers from several induced overheads, which 
slow down the operations. Moreover, it also increases the 
burden of credential management. To resolve this, at first, 
a timing problem is formulated around the operational 
period of the network.  
For this, let t be the time taken by an adversary to 
launch an attack, out of which let t’ be the minimum time 
for which the keys should not be updated. Considering this, 
the key-utilization time, tu, is identified, such that tu < t’ 
(<=t), for which the currently allocated keys are 
considered safe from the known attacks. Moreover, 
intermediate-key updates, Uk, should be minimized while 
maximizing the overall sustainability, SN, of the network, 
where, SN is derived as a function of induced overheads by 
altering the IPAT formulations [11], such that 
 
𝑆𝑁 = 
𝑛𝑈𝑘
𝐷.𝑃.𝑄
 ,    (1) 
 
Here,  
 
𝐷 (≤ 𝑁) = ∫ C(x, y)dx 
𝑟2
𝑟1
  (2) 
 
 
is the number of cars in the periphery (r) of a particular TM 
for a given density function C(x,y), N is the number of 
vehicles and E is the total number of entities operating in 
the network, P is the probability of loss in connectivity, 
which is calculated as 1 −
𝐸′
𝐸
; where E' is the number of 
transmitting/connected entities and 𝐸′ ≤ 𝐸 . Q is the 
number of passes between the entities. It is calculated as 
the number of messages shared between the involved 
entities and is dependent on the protocol used for sharing 
final data between the devices. Under strict evaluations, it 
may also add up the signaling messages as well as the 
messages used for re-authentication. For generic 
evaluations, the number of messages used by a protocol 
from initiating to full control is considered as a value of Q.  
Here, n is the sustainability balancing constant depicting 
the inverse of the number of hops between the vehicles and 
the entity dealing with the request generated for a 5G 
security function (key or service requests). These 
parameters can be used to resolve the above-discussed 
security issues by formulating a below-given optimization 
problem: 
 
max(𝑆𝑁) ∀𝐸, ∀𝑁,     (3) 
s.t. 
max (𝑡𝑢) , ∀𝑁, 
 
min(𝑈𝑘) ,⏟     and  Uk   ≥ 
in tradeoff with SN 
UN
′ , 
 
0 < 𝐷 ≤ 𝑁, 
 
0 <
𝑛−1(𝑛−1−1)
2
≤
𝐸(𝐸−1) 
2
, 𝑛−1  ≠ 𝐸,  
 
  min(𝑡𝑢 − 𝑡
′).          (4) 
 
In (4), UN
′  is the mandatory key-updates below which the 
network security is difficult to evaluate and additional 
tasks such as mobility management, re-authentication 
cannot be performed efficiently.  Furthermore, the tradeoff 
between the performances in terms of sustainability can be 
balanced for attaining the security of operations by 
considering the range of authentication. This means that 
the distance of the key update (R) should be managed to 
prolong the connectivity of the network without affecting 
the probability of loss in connectivity (P). Overall, 𝑃 ∝ 𝑅 
i.e., with an increase in the operational range, the loss in 
connectivity may increase, which should also be managed 
by the approach. Considering these, an optimal solution 
should aim at the selection of suitable points when key 
updates should be minimized and changed to maintain 
sustainability. For this, (1) can be remodeled to 
max  ( 𝑆𝑁
(𝑅)
), which is given by 
 
𝑆𝑁
(𝑅)
= 
𝑛𝑈𝑘
𝐷.𝑅.𝑄
,    (5) 
 
with the optimization principle following the same 
conditions in (3) ~ (4) additionally at min(𝑃) ; and 
max(1 − 𝑝𝑥) , which refers to the availability of 
credentials. 
 
 
6 Proposed Approach 
 
The proposed approach forms a dual management 
framework, which relies on two modes for establishing 
security in 5G-V2X. These modes are driven by distance 
as well as timing for the management of keys and 
maintaining a secure network and are termed as long-range 
authentication and short-range authentication. Both these 
modes facilitate a strong authentication for V2X while 
ensuring the security of backhaul between the TM and the 
hub. The proposed approach relies on key exchanges that 
are performed by utilizing the deployed sub-divided 5G 
security functions.  
The backhaul links are facilitated by the long-
range operations whereas the edge-enabled formations are 
supported by the short-range authentication. Both these 
modes further allow the timely management of keys and 
help to ensure the optimal solution for identification of the 
fail-safe points based on certain derivations presented in 
the lateral part of this section. 
The initial mode is based on the derivations of 
keys from the core, which is a part of long-range operations 
and then sub-division of initially obtained keys to support 
the procedures for short-range authentication.  
The long-range authentication uses mmWave 
communications, which must be facilitated by existing 
encryption algorithms. The long-range operations update 
the keys once the devices are deployed or reconfigured. 
Usually, existing solutions can support this operation; 
however, based on the speed of operations of mmWave, 
the associated operations of encryption and decryption 
should be performed in a timely manner to avoid any 
undue overheads. At present, this article deals with the 
identification of slots, i.e., when the associated keys should 
be updated and when the network should be reconfigured. 
The formation of the long-range authentication process is 
assumed and is beyond the scope of this article. 
The major issue prevails at the edge-enabled 
vehicles, which under high mobility, cause an additional 
overhead of key-regenerations as well as credential 
management. To further quantify this issue, a factorized 
module (Gf) is considered in the short-range model of 
V2X, which evaluates the speed (S), location (L), last 
updates for keys (UT), shared sessions (AS), refreshing rate 
of keys (FR), total keys (TK), zone traversals (ZT), and 
associatively (VA) of a vehicle to generate new keys or 
continue with the existing keys while maintaining the 
conditions stated in (3)~(5).  According to which, Gf =f(S, 
L, UT, AS, FR, TK, ZT, VA), where value of the function can 
be modeled with the help of priority constants and each 
value can help to determine the factor(s) which should be 
given importance while deciding the slots for key updates 
as well as for setting fail-safe points. In general, Gf  can be 
set as: 
 
𝐺𝑓 =
1
∑ 𝜃𝑤𝑖=1 𝑖
∑ 𝑔𝑖𝜃𝑖
𝑤
𝑖=1 .   (6) 
 
Here, 𝑤 (≤ 3) is the number of subdivided components 
(g) for the given Gf, which are given by: 
 
𝑔1 = 𝛿1 𝑓(𝑆, 𝐿),   (7) 
 
𝑔2 = 𝛿2 𝑓(𝑈𝑇 , 𝐴𝑆, 𝐹𝑅, 𝑇𝐾),  (8) 
 
𝑔3 = 𝛿3 𝑓(𝑍𝑇 , 𝑉𝐴),  (9) 
 
where 𝛿1 , 𝛿2 and 𝛿3 are the distribution constants for the 
associated functions in (7), (8) and (9), respectively with 
their sum in range 0 and 1; and 𝜃 is the associated priority 
constant and also has its value between 0 and 1 depending 
on the dependencies. At present, the proposed approach 
does not account for their in-depth evaluations and 
assumptions are considered to check for other major 
aspects of the number of passes and fail-safe points. These 
functions are dependent on the configuration of the 
network and the associated distribution changes based on 
the configurations. 
 
 
  
 
Fig.3 An overview of the security considerations with long and short-range authentications (V: Vehicle 
(UE), AP: Access Point, TM: Terminal). 
 
 
Fig.4 An overview of the key generations, long and short-range authentication and additional functions 
derived for managing sub-keys. 
 
 
6.1 Dual Security Management and Key Derivations 
 
An overview of the proposed approach along with key 
dependencies is presented in Fig.3 and Fig.4. The long-
range is operable between the TMs and the Hubs through 
the core. The long-range authentications are carried out 
using traditional 5G security functions, which uses SEAF 
and SMF coordination to follow security implementations. 
The original functions are kept exactly similar for long-
range authentications, and re-authentication, when the 
network undergoes substantial changes, is done through 
these passes. The long-range security functions follow the 
sub-dividing of original functions each time some major 
changes are made to the network setup. Moreover, it is 
flexible to decide if the changes made to the system are 
subject to revivification by the core.  
In certain cases, long-range authentications can only 
be used in the initial phases and then the entire security can 
be formulated based on certain long-term shared keys, 
which allows security throughout the time an entity is 
active in the network. However, as required, the key aspect 
is to handle the security of vehicles near users with lesser 
overheads. The proposed approach relies on the short-
range authentication which uses key-controlling feature 
and identification of fail-safe points to make sure that the 
network is aloof from the certain known cyber threats. 
Moreover, it helps to bring 5G security functions near the 
users at the edge by sub-dividing the functionalities, as 
shown in Fig.4. The description of sub-divided functions 
is as follows:  
 
 
 
Fig.5 Proposed dual security management framework with optimal slot identification and fail-safe 
markings. 
 
 
• The AMF function is further divided into two 
functions- the terminal management function (TM-
F) and the Hub management function (HM-F) that 
derive their keys from KOTK. Here, KOTK is the one-
time key, which is derived from KAMF, where KAMF 
is obtained similarly to the regular 5G security 
modules. KOTP is provided during the factory setup 
phases and is used once the entity is deployed in the 
network. It plays a key role in the long-range 
authentications. Any protocol aiming at long-range 
authentications can use this KOTP as a one-time 
shared key for observing a secure route between the 
entities in the initial phase. This KOTP can also be set 
to regeneration during reconfigurations or new keys 
can be derived to ensure the security of entities when 
the controlling hubs or switches are 
reallocated/reinitiated/rebooted. 
• KOTP is used to drive the terminal management key 
(KTM) and the hub management key (KHub). These 
keys are used for establishing the backhaul to edge 
connections and maintain the session based on the 
linkage with the KAMF.  
• Further, KHub and KTM are used to derive the 
operational keys, namely, KLRPK and KSRPK, i.e., 
long-range passkey and short-range passkey, 
respectively. The derived keys are used for initial 
long-range authentications and regular short-range 
authentications. The sub-derived keys authenticate 
vehicles' fronthaul to the edge and the backhaul 
between the TM and the hub. 
• The sub-derivative functions help to support the 
intra- and inter-mode of secure communications in 
V2X based on the nature of the passkey and its 
controlling entity as expressed in Fig.4. All the 
generic operations of these keys are driven by their 
respective core operations available from the 5G 
security functions. 
• The HM-F and the TM-F operate at the edge 
controlled by their parent function in the core and are 
considered aligned in the same layer as that of UPF 
and AF. In this way, the security controls are shifted 
near to the edge without compromising with the 
requirements of settings laid in the original 3GPP 
draft. Moreover, in the worst cases of zero-day 
attacks only the edge-entities are exploited, which 
can be reconfigured as well as replaced at fewer 
expenses compared with the entire remodeling of the 
core. 
 
In the proposed model, it can evidently be observed 
that with short-range authentications, the number of key 
operations becomes extensively large which is a core 
requirement of all the approaches aiming at edge-initiated 
security. In such a scenario, the overheads are bound to 
happen, and it can be controlled by the defined problem 
statement, which makes the proposed solution practically 
feasible as well as important. Additionally, it is observable 
that the proposed approach operates in two modes of 
authentication, which makes it a dual security management 
model whose details on formations can be observed in the 
next subsection. 
 
6.2 Overall Framework and Decision Module 
 
The proposed approach can be modeled into a combined 
framework as shown in Fig.5. The proposed framework 
includes several sub-modules, which finally uses a 
decision module to control the instances when the keys 
should be updated while maintaining a check on the 
sustainability of the network. The overall framework 
includes the following modules: 
• Long-range module: This module is responsible for 
managing the connectivity between the core and the 
device which forms the backhaul in the network. This 
module also controls the TMs and the hubs and 
additionally supports the coordination between the 
edge-side and the core-side 5G security functions. The 
long-range module interacts with the sub-divided keys, 
which are responsible for the security coordination of 
the vehicle with the edge network. This module is 
operable on the vehicle as well as network 
infrastructures. 
• Short-range module: This module operates in the lower 
periphery of the long-range module and is maintained 
on-board of all the vehicles. In certain cases, where 
cost is not an issue, this module can be used on 
infrastructures. However, in such a situation, the cost 
of security and associated algorithms’ complexity may 
increase by many folds. Thus, in the usual scenario, the 
short-range module is subject to implementation only 
on the vehicles’ interface. 
• Sub-divided key manager: This part of the framework 
manages the number of keys associated between the 
edge and the vehicles. This module maintains the 
hierarchy of keys and helps in derivation as well as 
updating whenever the requests are generated from the 
timing control. 
• Timing control: This part operates together with the 
short-range module and the sub-divided module and is 
invoked as per the decisions available on the 
sustainability of the network. The timing control helps 
to maintain a limit on the number of updates a system 
performs while operating vehicles as end users in 5G-
V2X. 
• Utility module: This module manages the slots which 
are observed from the timing control. The logs are 
observed in this part. This also helps to track the 
instances when the network faced vulnerabilities and 
was under threat by several cyber-attacks. 
• Safe point management: This module is the actual 
carrier of the network when the checks are observed 
based on the values of sustainability. This module 
helps to limit the number of key operations by 
operating in coordination with the timing control and 
the utility model. 
• Operational decision system: This module takes the 
final decision by evaluating the long-range and short-
range authentications. It helps to decide whether the 
updates are required in the keys or the network can be 
operated at the same configurations. 
• Optimization solver: This part is responsible for giving 
inputs to the system by using the factorized modules 
which is a combination of several parameters as used 
in the derivation of Gf. This module is dynamic and can 
be extended based on the available set of parameters 
with their values from the underlying sensors and 
actuators. 
 
The entire procedures of the dual security management 
framework can further be observed from the following 
Lemmas: 
 
Lemma-1: SN is divergent if the initial information on the 
key generation is unavailable. However, in the case of 
known timestamps, the network sustainability can be 
modeled over the available key updates and vehicle 
movement, such that for instances t1 and t2: 
𝑆𝑁 =  
𝛼2
2𝛽𝑁 (1 −
𝑛−1
𝐸
)
𝑁
𝑄
 (𝐸𝑖 (
𝛽 − 𝛼
𝑡1
) − 𝐸𝑖 (
𝛽 − 𝛼
𝑡2
)), 
 (10) 
 
at t2 - t1 > 0, E - n-1 > 0, 𝛽 − 𝛼 > 0, and Ei is the exponential 
integral [13]. 
 
Proof: Considering (1) to be following Poisson 
distribution for vehicles approaching at a rate of 𝛽 vehicles 
per unit time and operating with 𝛼 number of key-updates 
per unit time, 𝑈𝑘 can be given by 𝑒
−
𝛼
𝑡
(
𝛼
𝑡
)
𝑋
𝑋!
, (X=2), as only 
two keys are used for authentication (long range and short 
range keys) and D can be written as  𝑒−
𝛽
𝑡
(
𝛽
𝑡
)
𝑋′
𝑋′!
 , (X’=1), as 
each vehicle maintains its connectivity with one source 
from the network. Now, considering the involved entities 
in the network for authenticating a vehicle, and using the 
model in [12], the probability of no connectivity (P) can be 
given as (1 −
𝑛−1
𝐸
)
𝑁
. The number of passes remains at the 
discretion of the used protocol and is constant for this 
evaluation. By using these values in (1) and under fixed 
interval, the observed equation can be written as: 
 
𝑆𝑁 = 
1
𝑁(1−
𝑛−1
𝐸
)
𝑁
𝑄
∫
𝑒
−
𝛼
𝑡
(
𝛼
𝑡)
2
2!
𝑒
−
𝛽
𝑡
(
𝛽
𝑡)
1
1!
𝑑𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡1
 .       (11) 
 
On solving, at t2-t1>0, E-n-1 >0, 𝛽 − 𝛼>0, the observation 
is   
𝑆𝑁 = 
𝛼2
2𝛽𝑁(1−
𝑛−1
𝐸
)
𝑁
𝑄
 (𝐸𝑖 (
𝛽−𝛼
𝑡1
) − 𝐸𝑖 (
𝛽−𝛼
𝑡2
)),        (12) 
 
which is the desired output [13].  
 
Lemma-2: For extreme large rates of key exchanges and 
vehicle dynamics, SN is convergent to a linear function 
under asymptotic observations. This can be further used to 
identify fail-safe points with high accuracy up to which the 
network can be operated without much overheads and 
security breaches [13]. 
 
Proof: In continuation from Lemma-1, the result in (12) 
can be asymptotically analyzed for evaluating the behavior 
of the curve determining the sustainability of the V2X 
under given constraints. According to which, if 𝛼 and 𝛽 
increases to a larger value, the (12) reduces to a linear 
function, such that SN can be evaluated as a function 
comprising two metrics, i.e.  𝑆𝑁 = 𝑓 (
𝛼
𝑡
,
𝛽
𝑡
) ; and by 
following strict principles and limits, it can be given 
as 𝑆𝑁 =
𝛼
𝛽
. Moreover, in such a case, the behavior is not 
integrally divergent, and the network can be evaluated with 
linear timestamping. Now, considering these observations, 
the network fail-safe points up to which there is no need to 
update or refresh the keys can be evaluated as: 
 
𝐹𝑆 = {
𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑆𝑁 ≥ 𝑆𝑁
𝑇𝐻 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑡1 ≠ 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛 
𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑀𝑂 ≤ 𝑀𝑂
𝑇𝐻 , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
. 
(13) 
 
Here, MO is the message overhead evaluated as 
 
𝑀𝑂 =
𝑂𝑆(1−𝑃)
𝐸.𝑃
,            (14) 
 
where OS (signaling overheads) is said to be increasing 
exponentially. This is due to the reason that the key updates 
and vehicles follow the Poisson distribution with 
randomness observable from Lemma-1, based on which, 
Os can be modeled as  𝑂𝑏  (1 −
𝛼
𝑡
)𝑡 , where Ob is the 
overheads for initial authentication. This can be predicted 
between the instances, as shown in Lemma-1, only at a 
fixed number of updates (𝛼′ = 
𝛼
𝑡
), such that 
 
𝑂𝑆 =
𝑂𝑏(
𝑛−1
𝐸
)
𝑁
 
𝐸 (1−
𝑛−1
𝐸
)
𝑁 .
ln(1−𝛼′)t2−ln(1−𝛼′)t1  
ln(1−𝛼′)
, 
 (15)  
 
which is the desired output [13]. 
 
Lemma-3: The prediction on message overheads allows 
the network to take pre-hand decisions on the number of 
updates which would be enough to keep the system 
operating at the given rate. Such a prediction is based on 
the range of vehicles mobility during the time given time 
slots, and it driven by the probabilistic states, such that 
𝑀𝑂
(𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)
=  
𝑂𝑏 (
𝑛−1
𝐸
)
𝑁
(ln (1 −
𝛼
𝑡2
)
t2
− ln (1 −
𝛼
𝑡1
)
t1
)
ln (1 −
𝛼
𝑡2
)𝐸(𝑒
−
𝛼
𝑡2 − 𝑒
−
𝛼
𝑡1)
.
𝛼(𝑟
2
− 𝑟1)
𝛽𝑁 (1 −
𝑛−1
𝐸
)
2𝑁  (𝐸𝑖 (
𝛽 − 𝛼
𝑡1
)
− 𝐸𝑖 (
𝛽 − 𝛼
𝑡2
)) . (1 −
𝐸0
𝐸𝛾′
(𝑒−𝛾
′𝑡1 − 𝑒−𝛾
′𝑡2)) 
  
(16) 
at t2 - t1 > 0, t2 > 0, t1 > 0, r2  -r1 > 0, r2 > 0 and 𝑛−1 ≠ 𝐸. 
 
Proof: In the given model for (1), Beta function [25] can 
be used to model the traffic as it allows better prediction 
on the state of the network and allows accurate 
identification of the likelihood of the existence of a vehicle 
in the defined range, such that, 
 
𝐷 = 𝑓(𝐶(𝜗, 𝜇)) = ∫
Γ(𝜗+𝜇)
Γ(𝜗)Γ(𝜇)
𝛾𝜗−1(1 − 𝛾)𝜇−1
𝑟2
𝑟1
𝑑𝛾    (17) 
 
where 𝜗 and  𝜇 are the shape and scale parameters for the 
incoming rate 𝛾 of the vehicles in the range r1 and r2. The 
system operates with 𝜗 ≥ 1  and  𝜇 =
𝐸
∑ (𝑙𝑜𝑔(
1
1−𝑝𝑥
))𝑖 
𝐸
𝑖=1
 . 
Here, 1 − 𝑝𝑥  is the probability of availability of credentials 
and it can be operated only for vehicles (N) instead of the 
entire involved entities in the network given by E. Note 
that the Beta function is omitted under special 
circumstances when only the number of key-updates is 
controllable and vehicle’s actual movement is 
unpredictable. In the given prediction model, UK can be 
predicted as∫  𝑒−
𝛼
𝑡
(
𝛼
𝑡)
2
2!
 𝑑𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡1
, SN can be predicted from (10) 
and Os can be observed from (15). Here, P (= 1 − 𝑃𝑐) can 
be predicted based on the failure rate of the entities in the 
network such that  
 
𝑃𝑐 =
𝐸−(𝐸0𝑒
−𝛾′𝑡)
𝐸
, (18) 
 
where 𝛾′ is the outgoing rate of the vehicles in the defined 
range during an instance, and 𝐸0is the initial number of 
vehicles with 𝐸0 ≤ 𝐸. Now, by using outcomes of Lemma-
1 and Lemma-2, the message overheads can be predicted 
by using (1) and (14) as: 
 
𝑀𝑂
(𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) =
𝑄
𝑈𝐾
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 (𝑆𝑁
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 . 𝑂𝑆. 𝐷
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 . (1
− 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)). 
 
 (19) 
This on solving at unit shape parameters gives  
𝑀𝑂
(𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)
=  
𝑂𝑏(
𝑛−1
𝐸
)
𝑁
(ln(1−
𝛼
𝑡2
)
t2
−ln(1−
𝛼
𝑡1
)
t1
)
ln(1−
𝛼
𝑡2
)𝐸(𝑒
−
𝛼
𝑡2−𝑒
−
𝛼
𝑡1)
.
𝛼(𝑟
2
−𝑟1)
𝛽𝑁(1−
𝑛−1
𝐸
)
2𝑁  (𝐸𝑖 (
𝛽−𝛼
𝑡1
) − 𝐸𝑖 (
𝛽−𝛼
𝑡2
)) . (1 −
𝐸0
𝐸𝛾′
(𝑒−𝛾
′𝑡1 − 𝑒−𝛾
′𝑡2)) , 
  
(20) 
 
which is the desired output at t2 - t1 > 0, t2 > 0, t1 > 0, r2  -r1 
> 0, r2 > 0 and 𝑛−1 ≠ 𝐸. 
 
 
Lemma-4: If SN and MO are to be calculated based on the 
available information, the fail-safe points can be 
accommodated as in (13); However with the variation in 
SN, the fail-safe points are modeled as per the given 
distribution, and can be predicted based on current 
distribution, i.e., if Beta function is used as shown in 
Lemma-3, the likelihood of occurrence of fail-safe points 
(𝜏)  between t1 and t2 can be given as: 
 
𝜏 = argmax
Γ(1+𝜇)
T Γ(𝜇)
.
(𝑑2−1)
2
(1−𝑑2)
𝜇−
(𝑑1−1)
2
(1−𝑑1)
𝜇
𝜇−2
,  
 (21) 
 
assuming that 𝜇 − 2 > 0, 𝜗 = 1 , d2 - d1 > 0, 1 – d2 > 0 and 
1 – d1 > 0. 
 
Proof: Let 1 − 𝜔𝑥  be the probability that the available 
value of SN is following the given constraints of the system 
to keep on without changing or updating the current keys; 
𝜑 is the observable checkpoints in the system referring to 
the probabilistic time for updating keys. Now, considering 
similar distribution as that of vehicles in (17), the 
likelihood of fail-safe points (𝜏) can be accommodated as  
 
argmax
1
𝑇
∫
Γ(1+𝜇)
Γ(𝜇)
(1 − 𝜑)𝜇−1𝑑𝜑
𝑑2
𝑑1
, (22) 
  at unit shape parameter such that 𝜇 =
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑆𝑁)
∑ (𝑙𝑜𝑔(
1
1−𝜔𝑥
))𝑖 
𝑡𝑥
𝑖=1
, 
where tx (≤ 𝑡𝑢) is the known time slots for which average 
SN  can be observed. This on solving gives, 
 
𝜏 = argmax
Γ(1+𝜇)
T Γ(𝜇)
.
(𝑑2−1)
2
(1−𝑑2)
𝜇−
(𝑑1−1)
2
(1−𝑑1)
𝜇
𝜇−2
,      (23) 
 
which is the desired output at 𝜇 − 2 > 0, 𝜗 = 1 , d2 - d1 > 
0, 1 – d2 > 0 and 1 – d1 > 0.Now, assuming that the values 
of SN are separable for each of the vehicle irrespective of 
the number of vehicles operating in the same range, the 
likelihood of occurrence of a fail-safe point can be simply 
observed equivalent to 𝜔𝑥 by following the principles of 
likelihood defined in [26]. 
 
Lemma-5: In the given model, the scale parameter,  𝜇 , 
decides the operations of updating keys. Furthermore, it 
helps to fix the thresholds for deciding UN
′ when a vehicle 
is active for a long duration in the same zone. Thus, it 
becomes important to understand its asymptotic nature, 
which by using asymptotic equality [27] can be given as:  
 
𝑓(𝜇) = ∫
𝑒
−
𝛾′
𝑇
𝑙𝑜𝑔(
1
1−𝛾′
)
𝑑𝛾′
𝑐2
𝑐1
,    (24) 
 
at with 𝑐1 ≥ 0 , 𝑐2 − 𝑐1 > 0 , 𝑐1 < 1  and 𝑐2 < 1 . From 
which it can be observed that the true value of 𝑈𝑁
′  can 
never be predicted for a particular vehicle and it has to be 
assumed or alternatively derived using g1, which is the 
function of location and speed. 
Proof: By considering 𝜇 =
𝐸
∑ (𝑙𝑜𝑔(
1
1−𝑝𝑥
))𝑖.
𝐸
𝑖=1
  approximately 
equivalent to 
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑆𝑁)
∑ (𝑙𝑜𝑔(
1
1−𝜔𝑥
))𝑖.
𝑡𝑥
𝑖=1
, the scale parameter can be 
subjected to modeling based only on the outgoing-rate of 
vehicles instead of incoming rate when the minimum 
number of key updates is to be calculated. According to 
which, the above-discussed conditions can be written as: 
 
𝜇 =
𝐸
∑ (𝑙𝑜𝑔(
1
1−𝛾′
))𝑖
𝐸
𝑖=1
,  (25) 
 
which on following the discussions in Lemma-3 can be 
reduced to: 
 
𝜇 =
1
𝑙𝑜𝑔(
1
1−𝛾′
)
, (𝐸 = 𝐸0𝑒
−𝛾′𝑡). (26) 
The above condition can be converted to asymptotic 
equality using [27], such that 𝑓(𝜇), which is the asymptote 
of scale parameter, is given as: 
 
𝑓(𝜇) = ∫
𝑒
−
𝛾′
𝑇
𝑙𝑜𝑔(
1
1−𝛾′
)
𝑑𝛾′
𝑐2
𝑐1
,  (27) 
which is the desired observation with 𝑐1 ≥ 0, 𝑐2 − 𝑐1 > 0, 
𝑐1 < 1 and 𝑐2 < 1. However, under the given limits, the 
integral is divergent, which can be converged by following 
linear modeling for the scale parameter by using speed and 
location as the input metrics. Furthermore, the expression 
in (27) can be expanded for exponential asymptote, 
according to which, the asymptote behavior of 𝜇 can be 
modeled as 𝑇𝑡𝑥. 
The above observations are required to find the 
exact slots for updating the keys based on the available 
values of sustainability as well as message overheads. The 
thresholds are network and protocol dependent. These are 
identified based on the information of the time required to 
launch an attack on the deployed protocols. Especially, the 
general thresholds are motivated by the algorithms 
operating for the authentication of V2X or TM to the hub. 
 
Table 2. Numerical simulation settings 
Metrics Values 
β 2-10 (step 2) (A1-A5) 
α 𝛽/2 
N 10 
E 10-50 
n-1 5 
Q 1 to 5 
t1 5 s 
t2 105 s 
T 110 s 
𝛾′ 0.1 to 0.9 
r1 100 m 
r2 500 m 
c1 0.1 
c2 0.9 
ϑ 1 
tx Step by 5 s 
1 − 𝑝𝑥 0.1 to 0.9 
1 − 𝜔𝑥 0.1 to 0.9 
d1 0.1 
d2 0.9 
 
7 Numerical Evaluations 
 
The security of any network cannot be quantified but it can 
be predicted based on the network performance by 
assuming certain aspects of the system modeling. Based on 
this argument, the timing to update keys and managing 
security based on the incoming/outgoing rate of vehicles is 
quantifiable as expressed through Lemma-1 to Lemma-5. 
To further understand the impact of metrics on the 
sustainability and the location of fail-safe points, a 
numerical case study is conducted by using values defined 
in Table 2.  
The results for sustainability from Lemma-1, as 
shown in Fig. 6, suggest that the proposed approach allows 
effective tracing of the network activity and manage its 
security by keeping a check on the unnecessary key 
updates. 
These results suggest that significant overheads 
can be reduced from the network while keeping the 
security at the edge of the network by utilizing sub-divided 
functions for TMs and hubs. The protocol dependent Q and 
Uk used for authentication pose a significant impact on the 
performance as well as the security of the network. 
Quantitatively, the value for sustainability varies between 
53.1% and 84.9% compared to initial observed output at 
constant arrival and update rates for vehicles and keys, 
respectively.  
 
 
 
Fig. 6 Network sustainability w.r.t. the number of 
protocol-passes at different rates for incoming vehicles 
and the number of key updates. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 Message Overheads (MO) vs. the number of 
protocol-passes (Q). 
 
 
The results for message overheads are provided in Fig.7. 
These results are tracked based on the Lemma-2 by varying 
SN for the different range of α. With an increase in the 
number of passes, it is obvious that the message overheads 
are bound to increase. However, with the control over the 
arrival rate of requests, MO can be controlled to go beyond 
a limit. The results show a variation between 11.1% and 
16.1% for a varying range of sustainability provided in 
Fig.6. These results help to understand the limits of the 
fail-safe operations when the proposed dual security 
management is used for 5G-V2X. 
Similarly, the results are observed for the failure 
of probability by varying the vehicle outgoing rate at 
different step interval for vehicles, as shown in Fig.8. With 
vehicles moving at a faster pace, the probability of failure 
increases as the connections for sustainability decreases 
and it becomes difficult to manage the network. Such a 
condition also poses a significant impact on the credential 
management of the 5G-V2X. The results show that the 
average value of P varies between 0.83 to 0.99 for steps 
varying between 5 and 25. In addition, the prediction of the 
system shows an average observation between 0.39 and 
0.98, as shown in Fig. 9. This prediction is in the range of 
±11.7%. Furthermore, the scale parameter can be traced for 
varying values of 𝛾′and 𝜔𝑥, as shown in Fig. 10.  
 
  
 
Fig. 8 Probability of failure (P) in connectivity vs. vehicle 
leaving (outgoing) rate. 
 
Fig.9 Probability of failure (P) - prediction vs. observed 
values at varying timestamps. 
 
The graph shows the conditional value depicting 
that the network cannot perform if 𝜇 ≤ 2. The network at 
any time, when observing such scale values, undergoes 
reconfigurations leading to mandatory key updates. The 
management of the scale parameter can control the 
performance of the system as it affects the probability of 
connectivity in the proposed model. In an extension to 
these results, the scale parameter can be observed for 
varying values of Q, as shown in Fig.11. 
 
Table 3. Fail-safe durations for secure 5G-V2X for the proposed dual security management framework.  
(*d2 should be adjusted to accommodate high scaling values in the network; alternatively, the time 
steps need to be increased, which is again the subject of optimization and extremely crucial as 
discussed in the analytical model.) 
Cases 𝝁 
Q=1 
𝝁 
Q=2 
𝝁 
Q=3 
𝝁 
Q=4 
𝝁 
Q=5 𝝉 (Q=1) 𝝉 (Q=2) 𝝉 (Q=3) 𝝉 (Q=4) 𝝉 (Q=5) 
O
p
ti
m
is
ti
c 
S
ce
n
ar
io
  
(N
o
n
-r
ea
li
st
ic
 
v
al
u
es
) 
659.08 329.54 219.68 164.76 131.80 * * 4.39E+215 5.3E+160 5.9E+127 
311.20 155.60 103.73 77.79 62.23 * 3.65E+151 4.92E+99 5.8E+73 1.61E+58 
194.69 97.35 64.89 48.67 38.93 4.51E+190 2.056E+93 7.326E+60 4.43E+44 8.24E+34 
135.94 67.97 45.31 33.98 27.19 8.03E+131 8.736E+63 1.943E+41 9.28E+29 1.5E+23 
P
ra
ct
ic
al
ly
 f
ea
si
b
le
 S
ce
n
ar
io
 
(r
ea
li
st
ic
 v
al
u
es
) 
100.18 50.09 33.39 25.04 20.03 1.41E+96 1.169E+46 2.385E+29 1.09E+21 1.09E+16 
75.79 37.89 25.26 18.95 15.16 5.70E+71 7.496E+33 1.797E+21 8.96E+14 1.5E+11 
57.68 28.84 19.22 14.42 11.53 4.47E+53 6.734E+24 1.701E+15 2.77E+10 37629917 
43.15 21.57 14.38 10.79 8.63 1.34E+39 3.75E+17 2.54E+10 6816294 50296.62 
30.16 15.08 10.05 7.54 6.03 1.40E+26 1.257E+11 1279251.7 4280.43 146.0569 
- - - - 2 - - - - 0 
- - - - 1 - - - - 0 
 
 
 
The results suggest that with a lower number of 
protocol overheads, the security of the system increases as 
lesser variations are observed in the vehicle key updates, 
which cause fewer credential burdens leading to a high 
performing V2X. The performance of the system is much 
affected when the security functions are modeled over 
mmWave technology as it allows a quick update of sub-
divided functions allowing a fast and secure formation of 
5G-V2X.  
 
 
Fig. 10 Scale parameter variations vs. outgoing rate and 
sustainability governing probability. 
 
The further details of fail-safe durations which 
can be predicted based on the settings given in Table 2 and 
by following outcomes from Lemma-4 and Lemma-5 are 
provided in Table 3. These outcomes show that for the low 
values of 𝜇, the network cannot be operated with the given 
settings. However, with a better prediction of the scale 
parameters, the functional capability of the network 
increases along with the prediction of fail-safe durations. 
These results are not fixed; rather these show an 
observation on how the management of keys can optimize 
the security of the network while enhancing its 
sustainability. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11 Scale parameter vs. sustainability governing 
probability. 
 
 
It is evident that the sustainability of the network 
can be enhanced by carefully selecting the authentication 
protocol which should not cause excessive signaling 
overheads. Such practice and utilization of the proposed 
model can provide an optimal solution for managing the 
security of the backhaul-aware 5G-V2X as proved in this 
article. In further works, different types of vehicles (such 
as UAVs [25] [28]) can be considered to test the updates 
of keys along with the identification of specific-fail safe 
points.  Extremely dynamic vehicles can have severe 
effects on the system model and the location of servers for 
supporting 5G security functions. Moreover, the 
adaptation of the proposed model can be tested in the 
presence of known attacks, such as host impersonation [29] 
or emulation attacks [30]. 
 
8 Conclusions 
 
The V2X formations through 5G enhance the general 
capabilities of the vehicular network by utilizing the high-
performance cellular setups for advanced applications 
involving real-time media. However, security is always 
one of the major concerns for the vehicles that utilize 
cellular services for transmission. To understand such an 
issue, this article presented a tradeoff between 
sustainability and the number of key-updates in a 
backhaul-aware 5G-V2X. A dual security management 
framework is developed which considers security through 
long- and short-range authentications and the 
corresponding sub-divided 5G functions. The proposed 
solution aims at bringing security near to the users without 
any impact on the general 5G functions associated with the 
backhaul operations.  
Theoretical and analytical studies are conducted 
to understand the associated issues with the edge-initiated 
security in 5G-V2X.  In general, the work presented in this 
article helps to understand the impact of key-updates, 
joining and leaving rates of vehicles and the number of 
authentication-passes on the sustainability of the network. 
Based on these, the proposed dual security management 
framework identifies multiple fail-safe points up to which 
the network can be operated without any reconfigurations 
and risk of cyber-attacks. Multiple sub-functions are 
derived to facilitate the task of security management. 
Finally, numerical evaluations are conducted to visually 
understand the observations of the theoretical and 
analytical model for obtaining optimal security in the 
backhaul-aware 5G-V2X. 
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